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This study investigated the factorial validity of the 33-item self-
rated Emotional Intelligence Scale (EIS: Schutte et al., 1998) for 
use with athletes. In stage 1, content validity of the EIS was 
assessed by a panel of experts (n = 9). Items were evaluated in 
terms of whether they assessed EI related to oneself and EI 
focused on others. Content validity further examined items in 
terms of awareness, regulation, and utilization of emotions. 
Content validity results indicated items describe 6-factors: ap-
praisal of own emotions, regulation of own emotions, utilization 
of own emotions, optimism, social skills, and appraisal of others 
emotions. Results highlighted 13-items which make no direct 
reference to emotional experiences, and therefore, it is question-
able whether such items should be retained. Stage 2 tested two 
competing models: a single factor model, which is the typical 
way researchers use the EIS and the 5-factor model (optimism 
was discarded as it become a single-item scale fiolliwng stage 1) 
identified in stage 1. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results 
on EIS data from 1,681 athletes demonstrated unacceptable fit 
indices for the 33-item single factor model and acceptable fit 
indices for the 6-factor model. Data were re-analyzed after 
removing the 13-items lacking emotional content, and CFA 
results indicate partial support for single factor model, and 
further support for a five-factor model (optimism was discarded 
as a factor during item removal). Despite encouraging results for 
a reduced item version of the EIS, we suggest further validation 
work is needed. 
 






Emotional intelligence (EI) has emerged as a key concept 
among researchers and practitioners alike, and is subject 
to growing interest in sport psychology (Meyer and 
Fletcher, 2007; Meyer and Zizzi, 2007; Thelwell et al., 
2008; Zizzi et al., 2003). Further to this, meta-analysis 
results indicate positive relationships between EI and 
health-related variables (Schutte et al., 2007) and per-
formance variables (Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004). 
To date, only a few studies have examined EI in sport but 
the early studies point to encouraging results. Zizzi et al. 
found EI was associated significantly with sport perform-
ance, whereas Thelwell et al. found that EI related with 
perceptions of coaching effectiveness. Despite increased 
interest amongst sport psychologists to investigate the 
effects of EI, it is prudent to establish that measures of EI 
are valid for use in sport. Schutz (1994) argued that dem-
onstrating existing measures are valid and reliable should 
be the first stage in the research process. To date, no pub-
lished study has provided a comprehensive analysis of the 
validity of an EI measure for use in sport.  
Emotional intelligence can be defined as “the abil-
ity to carry out accurate reasoning about emotions and the 
ability to use emotions and emotional knowledge to en-
hance thought” (Mayer et al., 2008, p. 111). Emotional 
intelligence can be assessed using either an objective 
performance-based measure (Mayer-Salovey-Caruso 
Emotional Intelligence Test [MSCEIT: Mayer et al., 
1999]) or a subjective self-report measure (Emotional 
Intelligence Scale [EIS: Schutte et al., 1998] (see Meyer 
and Zizzi, 2007 for a review). In a performance test, indi-
viduals are asked to answer questions for which there are 
correct answers. In self-report tests, individuals are asked 
to reflect on emotional experiences across different situa-
tions and report their subjective perceptions. These per-
ceptions are indicative of an individual’s predispositions 
or traits.  
Evidence suggests that performance and self-
report measures show low to moderate correlations 
(Meyer and Zizzi, 2007), and that self-report measures of 
EI tend to correlate more strongly with personality than 
performance measures (see Bracket and Mayer, 2003; 
Meyer and Fletcher, 2007). Additionally, performance 
tests of EI tend to predict objective measures of perform-
ance and cognitive ability better than self-report tests 
(Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004). As illustrated above 
and discussed in detail elsewhere (Meyer and Fletcher, 
2007; Meyer and Zizzi, 2007; Petrides et al., 2007a; Pet-
rides et al., 2007b), disagreement exists with regard to the 
most appropriate way to assess EI generally. Presuppos-
ing that EI can be adequately assessed using both self-
report and performance tests, evidence showing weak 
correlations between self-report and performance tests 
suggest they assess different aspects of the concept 
(Engelberg and Sjöberg, 2004; O’Connor and Little, 
2003; Warwick and Nettelbeck, 2004). Decisions regard-
ing use of a performance or self-report measure should be 
informed by the relative contribution of each to the vari-
ables of interest (i.e., how strongly do beliefs about EI 
scores relate to emotion vs. how strongly do performance 
test scores relate to emotion). This approach is different 
from viewing one conceptualization/measure as inher-
ently superior to the other. With this in mind, it should be 
noted that self-report is the typical method of construct 
assessment in the sport and exercise psychology literature 
to date (see Vealey and Garner-Holman, 1998), and in the 
relatively    limited   sport   and   exercise   psychology-EI     
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literature specifically (Thelwell et al., 2008; Zizzi et al., 
2003).  
One commonly used measure of self-reported EI 
is the EIS (Austin et al., 2004; Schutte et al., 1998). The 
EIS is a 33-item measure designed to assess an individ-
ual’s perceptions of the extent to which s/he can identify, 
understand, harness, and regulate emotions in self and 
others. Schutte et al. used a set of 62 items derived from 
the model of Salovey and Mayer (1990). Exploratory 
factor analysis on data from 346 participants yielded a 
four-factor model which the author’s argued that by re-
moving 29-items and re-analyzing data, this produces an 
adequate one-factor solution. Schutte et al. report an ade-
quate internal consistency reliability (r = 0.87 to .90) and 
acceptable test-retest reliability (r = 0.78). In a subsequent 
study, Petrides and Furnham (2000) identified four fac-
tors: optimism/mood regulation, appraisal of emotions, 
social skills, and utilization of emotions. Similarly, Sak-
lofske et al. (2003) subjected the EIS to confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) and found moderate support in 
terms of the strengths of fit indices for the four-factor 
model. With the view of reducing socially desirable re-
sponses by including a greater number of reverse scoring 
items, Besharat (2007) found support for a 41-item four-
factor model among a population of Iranian students. By 
contrast, Gignac et al. (2005) tested several competing 
models for the EIS finding some support for a four-factor 
model that describes appraisal of emotions in the self, 
appraisal of emotions in others, emotional regulation of 
the self, and utilization of emotions in problem solving. 
Gignac et al. argued that further validation work on the 
scale was needed if the intention of the scale is to assess 
the theoretical model proposed by Salovey and Mayer 
(1990).  
It is commonly agreed among researchers that en-
suring measures are valid and reliable should be the first 
stage in the research process (Schutz, 1994). A central 
aspect of the nature of EI is that it is concerned with regu-
latory processes related to one’s own emotions and the 
emotions of others (Gignac et al., 2005). A composite 
measure of EI cannot distinguish emotions related to self 
from emotions related to others. It is also worth noting 
that multi-factorial models of the EIS such the four di-
mensional model proposed by Petrides and Furnham 
(2000) also does not distinguish EI in terms of a self and 
others.  
In summary, EI has been found to be a useful con-
struct in general psychology, and this trend appears to be 
continuing with promising initial results from the rela-
tively few studies published in sport and exercise psy-
chology. No published study has investigated the factorial 
validity of either a performance test or a self-report meas-
ure of EI among athletic samples. Given the tradition of 
using self-report in sport and exercise psychology (Vealey 
and Garner-Holman, 1998), it is argued that this repre-
sents a worthwhile starting point. Therefore, the purpose 
of this study was to investigate the validity of the EIS. 
The research process involved two stages. In Stage 1, the 
aim was to investigate the content validity through asking 
a panel of experts to assess the suitability of items in the 
EIS as indicators of EI theory. In Stage 2, the aim was to 
investigate factorial validity of the EIS using CFA. Two 
hypothesized models (i.e., single factor, 6-factor) were 
tested using CFA on a sample of athletes. The first model 
tested was the single factor model, which has been used in 
the majority of published studies to date (see Schutte et 
al., 2007; Zizzi et al., 2003). The second model tested was 
a 6-factor model based on the work of Salovey and Mayer 
(1990). The six-factor model assesses EI in self and others 






Anastasi and Urbina (1997) argued that construct validity 
should be considered at the initial stages of questionnaire 
development. This suggestion guided the examination of 
the validity of the EIS whereby items were placed into 
factors based on a qualitative assessment of the meaning 




Participants and procedure 
Participants were nine sport and exercise psychology 
researchers (Age range 27-41 years; male; n = 4, female; 
n = 5). Expert status was operationalized in terms of re-
cruiting people who have published research in peer refe-
reed academic journals, or presented papers at academic 
conferences on topics related to emotion, mood, EI, 
and/or psychological skills in sport and exercise settings. 
Participants indicated the extent to which each item as-
sessed EI in terms of awareness, regulation, and utiliza-
tion of emotions in self and others (see Salovey and 
Mayer, 1990; Schutte et al., 1998). Participants evaluated 
each item on the EIS independently and then discussed 
the meaning of items collectively.  
 
Results and Discussion  
 
Content validity results yielded the identification of six 
factors with four factors describing aspects of EI related 
to oneself (i.e., appraisal of own emotions, regulation of 
own emotions, utilization of emotions, and optimism), 
and two factors describing aspects of EI in relation to 
others (i.e., regulation of others’ emotions, a factor la-
beled social skills by Schutte et al., 1998, and appraisals 
of others’ emotions). It should be noted that a balanced 
model with three factors describing  EI related to self, and 
three factors related to EI in others could not be identi-
fied. It was not possible to identify items in the EIS that 
assess the ability to utilize the emotions in others. Items in 
the 6-factor model are listed in Table 1.  
Content validity results identified 13-items lack a 
direct assessment of emotional experiences. Given the 
definition of EI presented previously (Mayer et al., 2008), 
each item should contain reference to emotional experi-
ences. For example, the item “I find it hard to understand 
the non-verbal messages of other people” assesses per-
ceived difficulties in assessing non-verbal messages. It 
should be emphasized that there are not direct assess-






stand non-verbal messages. It is possible that an individ-
ual might find understanding non-verbal messages hard to 
understand, but this might not activate an emotional re-
sponse. The item might be better phrased as “I become 
tense (emotional content) in situations when I feel I need 
to understand the non-verbal messages of other people”.  
Items lacking a direct emotion focus include: 
1. “I find it hard to understand the non-verbal mes-
sages of other people” 
2. “I am aware of the non-verbal messages other peo-
ple send” 
3. “I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send to 
others” 
4. “When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times 
I faced similar obstacles and overcame them” 
5. “Some of the major events of my life have led me to 
re-evaluate what is important and not important” 
6. “I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to 
tasks I take one” 
7. “I know when to speak about my personal problems 
to others” 
8. “Other people find it easy to confide in me” 
9. “I compliment others when they have done some-
thing well” 
10. “I present myself in a way that makes a good im-
pression on others” 
11. “When I am faced with a challenge, I give up be-
cause I believe I will fail” 
12. “I expect that I will do well on most things I try” 
13. “I expect good things to happen” 
 
The strategy in the present study was to test both 
hypothesized models using all 33-items, and then re-
analyze after removing the 13-items identified above. The 
rationale for following this procedure was to facilitate 
comparisons with previous research that has investigated 
the validity of the 33-item EIS. Experts decided that an 
inclusion criterion for the retention of an item in the re-
analysis of data was for each item to contain reference to 
emotions, moods, or feelings, or a recognizable discrete 
emotion (anger, anxiety, etc). Given the proposal that 13-
items lack emotional content, it was hypothesized that a 
20-item version of the EIS should demonstrate improved 
fit indices. However, as content validity results left only  a 
single-item in the optimism factor, data re-analysis exam-
ined a 19-item and five-factor model.  
 
Study II  
 
Test of factorial validity 
Confirmatory factor analysis tested two models. The first 
was a single factor first-order model. Research has typi-
cally summed EIS scores to produce a single score 
(Schutte et al., 2007; Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004; 
Zizzi et al., 2003). The second model tested was a 6-





Volunteer physical activity participants (n = 1681) com-
pleted the 33-item EIS. Participants were university stu-
dent-athletes (n = 1072, Age: M = 21.12, SD = 6.7 years), 
exercisers  (n = 275,  Age:  M = 22.23,  SD = 9.23 years),  
runners (n = 80, Age: M = 27.34, SD = 15.42 years), and 
judo players (n = 254, Age: M = 34.62, SD = 15.10 
years). Participants represented a heterogeneous sample 
of athletes who competed at levels ranging from 
elite/professional sport to recreational sport, as well as 
those for whom the primary goal was health and fitness. 
 
Procedure 
Following institutional ethical approval from the institu-
tion of the first author, athletes were recruited via a num-
ber of different approaches (e.g., e-mail invitations, invi-
tations in lectures, invitations on on-line learning mod-
ules). Student-athletes could complete an online version 
or a pencil-paper version of the EIS. Student-athletes 
completed the measure either before or after formal lec-
tures, while other participants (i.e., marathon runners, 
judo players, exercisers) completed the measure at their 
respective training sessions. It should be noted that Inter-
net-based surveys have become a popular method of data 
collection in psychology, with evidence suggesting that 
online research is equivalent to traditional offline (i.e., 
paper-pencil [PP]) methods (Lonsdale et al., 2006).  
 
Data analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis using EQS V6 (Bentler and 
Wu, 1995) was used to test the hypothesized models. As 
there was evidence of multivariate non-normality in the 
data, models were tested using the Robust Maximum 
Likelihood method.  This method has been found to effec-
tively control for overestimation of X2, under-estimation 
of adjunct fit indexes, and under-identification of errors 
(see Hu and Bentler, 1995). The 6-factor measurement 
model for the EIS specified that each item related to its 
hypothesized factor with the variance of the factor fixed 
at 1. Factors were allowed to freely inter-correlate. In 
terms of assessing model fit, long standing debate contin-
ues on which are the best fit indices to use. It is generally 
agreed (Hu and Bentler, 1995) that incremental fit indices 
should be greater than .90 with the standardized root 
mean error of approximation below .08. Hu and Bentler 
(1999) indicated that incremental fit indices such as the 
CFI should be greater than .95, which is the criterion used 
in the present study. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis results for the 33-item single 
factor model results were: Normative Fit Index (NFI) = 
0.82; Non-Normative Fit Index (NNFI) = 0.83; Compara-
tive Fit Index (CFI) = 0.84; and Root Mean Error of Ap-
proximation (RMSEA) = 0.05. Incremental fit indices 
show poor fit, with all values being lower than the .95 
criterion suggested by Hu and Bentler (1999). The 
RMSEA was an acceptable value. When seen collec-
tively, the single-factor model demonstrates a poor fitting 
model to the data. By contrast, fit indices for the 6-factor 
were: NFI = 0.92; NNFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.95; and RMSEA 
= 0.03, and therefore within an acceptable value other 
than the NFI that was marginally below the 0.95 criterion. 
Factor loadings for the items on both models are con-










Table 1. Factor loadings for the 33-item Emotional Intelligence Scale for a single-factor and 6-factor model. 









Appraisal of others emotions     
By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are experiencing .48 .88 .69 .73 
When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel as 
though I have experienced this event myself 
.37 .93 .48 .88 
I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them .46 .89 .65 .75 
It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do .28 .96 .38 .92 
I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice .45 .89 .64 .77 
I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people* .32 .95 .47 .88 
I am aware of the non-verbal messages other people send* .46 .89 .67 .74 
Appraisal of own emotions     
I am aware of my emotions as I experience them .42 .91 .63 .78 
I know why my emotions change .41 .91 .62 .79 
I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them .50 .87 .72 .70 
I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send to others* .45 .90 .64 .77 
When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and over-
came them* 
.51 .86 .67 .74 
Regulation     
I have control over my emotions .40 .92 .51 .86 
I seek out activities that make me happy .43 .90 .66 .72 
Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is important and 
not important* 
.38 .93 .50 .87 
I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to tasks I take on* .60 .80 .78 .62 
I know when to speak about my personal problems to others* .37 .93 .50 .87 
Social Skills     
I like to share my emotions with others .31 .95 .44 .89 
I arrange events others enjoy .39 .92 .52 .86 
I help other people feel better when they are down .55 .83 .70 .71 
Other people find it easy to confide in me* .40 .92 .56 .83 
I compliment others when they have done something well* .52 .86 .66 .75 
Utilization of emotions     
When my mood changes, I see new possibilities .44 .90 .51 .86 
When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last .41 .91 .47 .88 
When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me .50 .87 .59 .80 
When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas .51 .86 .58 .81 
When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas .42 .91 .49 .87 
I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles .59 .81 .67 .74 
I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others* .45 .90 .54 .84 
Optimism     
Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living .31 .95 .51 .86 
When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail* .39 .92 .60 .80 
I expect that I will do well on most things I try* .38 .93 .64 .77 
I expect good things to happen* .35 .94 .58 .82 
* Item lacks emotional content and removed from the revised model. 
 
As indicated in Table 1, factor loadings for the 
single-factor model range from 0.28 to 0.60 with a mean 
factor loading of 0.43 ± 0.07. In terms of identifying 
trends to explain weak loading items, the most discernible 
observation is for reverse scoring items (e.g., items 
worded in the direction opposite to that of other items). 
All three reverse scoring items demonstrate weak factor 
loadings (i.e., “I find it hard to understand the non-verbal 
messages people send”, “it is difficult for me to under-
stand why people feel they way they do”, and “When I am 
faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will 
fail”) in both single and six-factor models. 
Previous research has found evidence to suggest 
reverse scoring items perform poorly in single-factor 
models (Woods, 2006). In studies that test multifactoral 
models, previous research has found that CFA tends to 
produce better fitting results when all reverse scored items 
are contained on the same factor and all items assess the 
construct in the same direction (Tomas and Amparo, 
1999). It is proposed that participants might not read 
reverse scoring items correctly, and that poor factor load-
ing is attributed to carelessness of respondents. In an 
examination of respondent-carelessness, Woods showed 
that as few as 10% of careless respondents can result in 
the rejection of a good fitting unidimensional scale. In the 
present study, two of the three reverse score items are 
clearly focused on assessing aspects of emotional control. 
Both items have an equivalent positively worded item that 
conveys almost identical meaning with an acceptable 
factor loading. Therefore it is plausible that low factor 
loadings for two of the three reverse the scoring items 
could be attributed to a respondent carelessness magnified 
by CFA. Previous research has included reverse scoring 
items as a strategy to improve validity (Besharat, 2007). 
However, it should be noted that reverse score items  






Lane et al. (1999) showed reverse scoring items in the 
Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (Martens et al., 
1990) demonstrated weak factor loadings. It is possible 
that athletic samples magnify limitations of reverse scor-
ing items. Clearly future research following the method-
ology adopted by Woods (2006) using athletic samples is 
desirable.  
 CFA procedures using the remaining 19-items 
were repeated for both single and 5-factor models (opti-
mism discarded). CFA results for the single factor model 
were: NFI = 89; NNFI = 90; CFI = .91; and RMSEA = 
.06, and for the five-factor model: NFI = 93; NNFI = 96; 
CFI = .96; and RMSEA = .04. In comparison to the 33-
item version of the EIS, fit indices improved following 
the removal of 14-items for both single and six-factor 
models. Results for the single factor model are acceptable 
for the RMSEA and marginally lower for incremental 
indices (NFI, NNFI, & CFI) using the criterion values for 
acceptable fit proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999).  
Results of the present study show that the EIS for 
use in sport differs to findings reported in samples from 
the general population (Austin et al., 2004; Besharat, 
2007; Schutte et al., 1998). However, we argue that the 
primary explanation for these differences can be ascribed 
methodological factors. It is proposed that the usage of 
exploratory factor analysis techniques to develop a factor 
structure during the original EIS and subsequent valida-
tion studies represents a limitation. Exploratory factor 
analysis is a data driven approach (see Thompson and 
Daniel, 1996) in which a factor structure is produced from 
the data, rather than testing the extent to which data were 
consistent with a hypothesized model. The decision to use 
exploratory techniques seems surprising as researchers 
were looking to test a theoretical framework rather than 
exploring the data with a view to producing new models. 
Although subsequent validation studies have used CFA, 
they tested models developed through exploratory proce-
dures, and therefore retain the mathematically driven 
model. An example of how exploratory factor analysis 
can produce a theoretically unclear factor is exemplified 
by examining the meaning of the optimism/mood regula-
tion factor produced in the exploratory factor analysis 
results by Petrides and Furnham (2000). By combining 
optimism and mood regulation into a single factor, this 
precludes examining the extent to which optimistic beliefs 
are associated with regulatory behaviors, a line of enquiry 
that should be salient among individuals with an unrealis-
tic sense of optimism (Colvin et al., 1995). For example, 
an extreme optimist should see the positive aspects of 
situations, and therefore should not anticipate needing 
self-regulatory skills, and consequently, may not develop 
such skills. However, over optimism has been associated 
with self-enhancement, unrealistic perceptions of task 
difficulties, and exaggerated perceptions of control 
(Colvin et al., 1995). Following this logic, extreme opti-
mists are unlikely to anticipate needing to manage intense 
emotions experienced before important competition. As 
events unfold, the true nature of task difficulties emerge, 
and if this results in failure to attain goals, then unpleasant 
emotions are likely to increase. By contrast, a pessimist 
might develop effective mood-management strategies as 
anticipatory coping efforts to manage potentially stressful 
situations. A pessimist might anticipate experiencing high 
anxiety and have developed strategies to manage these 
feelings. Whilst the assumptions suggested above are 
speculative, they indicate the difficulty of including items 
that might be assessing different constructs. It is worth 
remembering that researchers and practitioners will calcu-
late factor scores by summing all items in the factor, sug-
gesting that it is imperative that items assess a similar 
underlying concept. As evidence suggests high EI is asso-
ciated with positive health and performance outcomes 
(Schutte et al., 2007; Van Rooy and Viswesvaran, 2004), 
then high scores on each scale are assumed to be desir-
able. With the above in mind, high scores on optimism 
might behave differently to mood-regulation, and there-
fore optimism and mood-regulation should be conceptual-
ized independently.  
Taken together, the argument presented above 
suggests that results of the current study could make im-
portant contributions to research in EI by identifying a 
theoretically-informed factor structure that removed items 
with limited emotional content. As indicated in a pertinent 
review by Mayer et al. (2008), EI is a popular topic to 
research, with the emphasis being on the relationships 
between the construct and behavior. Whilst such an ap-
proach is logical, it assumes that the EI scales are valid 
and reliable. However, as indicated by the findings of the 
present study, the EIS contains items lacking an emo-
tional focus. Although the EIS has been a frequently used 
measure of EI, previous research has identified similar 
limitations (Gignac et al., 2005). In agreement with the 
findings and suggestions made by Gignac et al. (2005), 
further validation work on the EIS is needed. We agree 
with this suggestion and propose that further work should 
look to revise items so that they have a clear emotional 
focus and develop specifically for the hypothesized factor 
in which they should belong.  
Findings from the present study lend support to 
the value of conducting a content validity study and scru-
tinizing the intended meaning of items closely. Although 
it is a commonly held belief that content validity is a key 
part of the validation process, it typically takes second 
place to examining factoral validity. Jones et al. (2005) 
provides an example of a study that conducted a detailed 
analysis of content validity. Jones et al. developed content 
validity over several stages. They used an iterative proc-
ess in which experts (knowledge of underlying theory) 
and athletes (knowledge of emotions experienced in 
sport) contributed to develop a measure that assessed a 
theoretical framework for assessing emotions in sport. 
Once the factor structure was developed, they used con-
firmatory procedures to test the hypothesized model. This 
approach is different to developing items that support a 
theoretical framework and then using exploratory proce-
dures. Using the framework for developing and validating 
a scale for use in sport (Jones et al., 2005), we suggest 
that future research continues to revise items in the EIS by 




In conclusion, given the incumbent link between the va-
lidity of theory and methods testing, the present study 





sought to investigate the validity of the EIS for use in 
sport. Notwithstanding the debate on the nature of EI, and 
the extent to which the construct can be assessed through 
ability or through self-report tests, findings from the pre-
sent study suggest that researchers could use a 19-item 
version of EIS to assess perceptions of (or self-reported) 
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• Given the inherent link between construct measure-
ment and theory testing, it is imperative for re-
searchers to pay close attention to measurement is-
sues  showed poor fit indices. The present study in-
vestigated a self-report emotional intelligence for 
use in sport 
• Results indicate that a single-item model shows poor 
fit with acceptable fit indices for a 6-factor model. 
• A revised 5-factor and 19-item model showed im-
proved model fit.  
• Despite encouraging results, we suggest further vali-
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